Robert M. Cutler on Energy and Eurasia tag:www.robertcutler.org,2007:/blog//1 2007-04-09T17:23:58Z  ]]> Movable Type 3.33 Interview on Iraqi Kurdistan and the Situation in Iraq tag:www.robertcutler.org,2007:/blog//1.39 2007-04-09T00:19:33Z 2007-04-09T17:23:58Z Question: If you were an advisor to the president of the Kurdistan region, what recommendations would you make to him? Answer: If I had the honor to advise the president of the Kurdish region, I would recommend taking a broad perspective, looking beyond the immediate political situation created by the United States. ... iraq kurds alawi hamas hezbollah -->English original of the text in press, in Kurdish, in the Erbil news-weekly Gulan Question: What is your point of view on Iraq's near-term future? Will U.S. policy fail? And if so, will Iraq be divided? Answer: The U.S. policy succeeded in removing Saddam Hussein, which was very important to the Kurds in Iraq. But further U.S. policy will fail if it seeks to destroy the secular and socially progressive aspects of the Iraqi culture, which include health care delivery, high literacy rates, education for girls as well as boys, etc.]]> Question: The Arab countries are abandoning their silence on Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Jordan are both expressing concern and have invited the president of the Kurdish region Massoud Barzani to visit. How do you interpret president Barzani’s visit to these countries? Answer: Barzani's visit is in the perspective of reassurances from the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan, that Sunni Muslims in Iraq should not left unprotected, to be crushed under an Iranian-style Shiite majority. Question: Iraqi Kurdistan is a part of Iraq its totally different from the rest of the country: it is a safe and stable region which an evolving democracy, and commerce and free market. That being the case, do you think this region can play an effective role in developing Iraq? Answer: A safe and stable Kurdish region in Iraq can play an important and effective role not only in helping development in Iraq but also in the whole region. Question: The civil war between Shiite Arabs and Sunni Arabs threatens the whole Iraq and the area in general. If this war is not controlled, how will it end? Answer: The civil war between Shiite and Sunni Arabs in Iraq should not be a threat to the Kurds, who after all are not Arabs. Question: Iran and Syria are both neighbors of Iraq, and they have negative effects on Iraq’s situation, particularly through the Iranian government’s hostility to the United States. How do you see Iran’s conflict with the United States? Answer: The only way that there will be no conflict between the United States and Iran is if the U.S. promotes a theocratic Shiite state in Iraq. Clearly this will not happen, so conflict between the U.S. and Iran is a fact of life. If Syria supports secular-minded groups in Iraq, then this is not negative. However, that support is outweighed by tactical and strategic Syrian support for Iranian training and equipment of Hamas and Hezbollah. Iranian and Syrian support for these groups only inflames the region in general, making life for Kurds in Iraq, and not only in Iraq, more difficult. Question: Turkey is also a neighbor of Iraq and at the same time an American ally. Still, Turkey sometimes issues threats against the Iraqi Kurdistan region, which is the only safe part in Iraq. If Turkey considers itself an American ally, why doesn’t it try to support U.S. policy in Iraq? Answer: Turkey’s hesitations about U.S. policy in come from the fact that if Kurds in Iraq become too autonomous and influential, then this could lead to demands for autonomy by Kurds in Turkey. A secular and socially progressive Iraqi state with support from Iraqi Kurds is therefore also in the interest of Kurds in Turkey. Question: The Bush Administration is now under pressure from public opinion and also the Democratic-party majority in the U.S. Congress. At the same time, it is difficult to defend the position that the president Bush’s policy in Iraq is a big success. This being so, how long can Bush stand up against the challenge of public opinion and congressional Democrats against his Iraq policy? Answer: Due to the way that the U.S. Constitution defines the powers of the branches of government, the policy of the Bush Administration has no need to change its stated intention to remain in Iraq, despite any pressures from Congress or U.S. public opinion. Question: The Bush Administration was relying on Maliki’s government in Baghdad, but this government couldn’t help the United States as much as seemed necessary. Within Iraq there is now a movement towards a new political alliance headed by Dr. Ayad Alawi. Do you think that the United States will cease supporting Maliki’s government and support Dr. Ayad Alawi instead? Answer: The United States will seek to work with whatever government the Iraqi parties form and look for all the help it can get from any Iraqi political formations, with the exception that it will hesitate to take steps that would increase Iranian influence in the region. Question: The fragmentation of some parts of Shiite majority, such as the departure of the Fazilla party and Mr. Dawd Qasm, has led to an even balance between the Shiites on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Ayad Alawi formation including the whole Sunni party. So far, while the Kurds are now as a result called “kingmakers”, they have not decided anything in this regard. What is your perspective on the Kurds’ situation in the future of Iraq? Would you advise the Kurds to remain with the Shiite majority coalition or to build a new alliance with Ayad Alawi? Answer: The Kurds' main interest is in a secular and modern Iraqi state with Kurdish autonomy. This is not only to their benefit but also to the benefit of Kurds outside Iraq. Therefore the most important priority for Kurdish policy in Iraq today is to oppose the dominance any theocratic or centralizing political tendencies. Question: If you were an advisor to the president of the Kurdistan region, what recommendations would you make to him? Answer: If I had the honor to advise the president of the Kurdish region, I would recommend taking a broad perspective, looking beyond the immediate political situation created by the United States. If Turkey becomes a member of the European Union, as it still wishes to do, then under the rules the European Union, it becomes possible that Kurdish is an official language of Europe. Furthermore, the Kurdish region in Iraq could possibly find itself in a relation with the EU like East Germany. During the Cold War, East Germany was a de facto member of the European Union through West German proxy. Like the border between the two Germanys, it is hard to imagine the Turkish-Iraqi border (which would be the external border of the EU, like the West German border during the Cold War) cutting off the Kurdish population in Turkey from the Kurdish population in Iraq.]]> A New Chance for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline? tag:www.robertcutler.org,2007:/blog//1.31 2007-02-28T20:58:15Z 2007-03-06T21:07:36Z Asia Time OnLine, 28 February 2007. Copyright © Robert M. Cutler. A significant indicator of Turkmenistan's future diplomatic and economic course is whether new President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov will undertake a rapprochement with Azerbaijan. ]]> Former president Saparmurat Niyazov, self-styled "Turkmenbashi" (leader of Turkmens), who died in December, was on notoriously poor terms with the erstwhile Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliev, father of the country's current President Ilham Aliev. This antipathy, together with Niyazov's failure to grasp the intricacies of contemporary negotiations on petrochemical-energy development, which he nevertheless insisted on leading from Turkmenistan's side, was responsible for the ultimate failure of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project in the late 1990s. That TCGP project would have piped Turkmenistani gas under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, then out to world markets by a Georgian-Turkish gas route parallel to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline that recently entered service. In the event, the surprise discovery of significant gas reserves (instead of the expected oil with only associated gas) in the Shah-Deniz field offshore from Azerbaijan made Turkmenistan's gas superfluous to the project. The gas-pipeline project from Shah-Deniz to Turkey through Georgia, christened the South Caucasus Pipeline, is now well under construction. A precondition for any international financing of any new TCGP project is resolution of the territorial dispute between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over the mid-south Caspian field that the latter calls Kyapaz and the former calls Serdar. Although Azerbaijan's case for sole sovereignty over Kyapaz/Serdar is well founded under international law, Heydar Aliev offered in 1997 the possibility of joint development of the field to Niyazov, who nevertheless rejected it. Today, the then-projected TCGP route through Georgia to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast (or a variant going through Georgia and under the Black Sea, or also under the aegis of the Austrian-led Nabucco project via the Turkey-Greece gas connector that the Europeans have been trying to make happen for a decade) could still bring Turkmenistani gas into the European markets, eliminating any need to transit Russian territory. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia have implemented a "modified median line" principle, well established in international law, to the demarcation of sovereignty over resources under the bed of the Caspian Sea. This offers a precedent for the resolution of the territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the Kyapaz/Serdar field, which lies in the middle of the southern Caspian Sea, divided by a median line between the Azerbaijani and Turkmenistani coasts if such a line were to be drawn. For this, it would not be necessary to resolve boundary questions between Azerbaijan and Iran, between Turkmenistan and Iran, or even between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. It would only require Turkmenistan to agree on such a "modified median line" principle to demarcate its boundary with Azerbaijan over use of undersea resources. (This is not legally the same as claiming ownership or sovereignty over the seabed itself.) Azerbaijan has a historically better-established claim to the entire Kyapaz/Serdar block also because of the physical geography of the region, which places the island much closer to offshore Azerbaijani development than to the mini-archipelago stretching from the Turkmenistan shoreline into the southern Caspian Sea. The application of the "modified median line" would implement the 1997 proposal by the Azerbaijani side to develop the block together with Turkmenistan, a proposal rejected by Niyazov at the time. Given the engineering and technology necessary for such development, Turkmenistan would need outside help, and Azerbaijan has the most significant infrastructure and experience in the region, including established access to foreign expertise, with which to begin the development. Exactly that approach was taken in discussions between Kazakhstan and Russia regarding deposits that straddled their common demarcation line in the northern Caspian Sea offshore; and after agreeing on the modified median line principle, these two countries subsequently reached binding written understandings on the development of those deposits, which are now in the process of being jointly developed by companies from the two countries. So this is an established method in international law with a precedent in the Caspian Sea region. Even an oral endorsement of its acceptance by Turkmenistan, if followed up by concrete action, would signal a willingness to undertake businesslike relations with a view toward increasing outlets to world markets for Turkmenistani gas. One of the factors conditioning prospects for construction of any gas pipeline westward from Turkmenistan will be the prices offered by Russia to Turkmenistan for gas at its border. These prices have been the subject of perennial haggling between Ashgabat and Moscow, with several contracts being agreed and broken and renegotiated over the past decade and a half. The problem from the Turkmenistan side is that there is at present nowhere else for the gas to go. (Statistics on the small quantity of exports to Iran, the one exception, are notoriously unreliable; figures in the public domain are almost certainly overestimates.) Prices paid to Turkmenistan for delivery of gas at the Russian border have gradually increased over the years, even before Russia began increasing its own prices for export (or re-export of Turkmenistan's gas) to third countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. Berdymuhammedov has publicly assured Russia that Turkmenistan will honor its contractual obligations to Moscow out to the year 2028, the terminus date of a 25-year contract signed in April 2003. This contract provided for sales to Russia at a price of $44 per thousand cubic meters (tcm). By late 2005, Gazprom had ceded to Niyazov's insistence for a rate increase, agreeing to a price of $65/tcm for deliveries during the first half of 2006. Almost immediately into the new year, in the wake of the Ukraine gas imbroglio (Ukraine is in fact historically the principal recipient for gas from Turkmenistan even in the Soviet period), Niyazov began agitating for yet another price hike. Moscow resisted until the end of the summer but finally caved in and agreed a price of $100/tcm with Turkmenistan. At his death, Niyazov had given no impression of relenting in his efforts to drive up the price. The simple fact is that Gazprom has managed its Russian resources so poorly and failed so greatly to make any significant improvements or important capital investments that Russia not only is dependent on gas from Turkmenistan for exports to Ukraine and, through Ukraine, to Europe, but also simply needs Ashgabat's gas for domestic Russian consumption during the cold winter months. There are other non-Russian outlets theoretically available to Turkmenistan: through Kazakhstan to China, through Afghanistan to Pakistan, and through Iran to Turkey, to name but three. Each of them has, like a renovated TCGP project, its own particular problems. The Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey route may have the greatest practical obstacles, despite a recent oral agreement in principle between Turkish and Iranian representatives to pursue the idea. However, Turkey has taken care throughout the current decade to maintain very good relations with Niyazov, who was in turn favorably disposed to the Anatolian Turks, whom he considered brethren; and Ankara naturally has excellent relations with Baku, as well as demonstrated positive cooperation in energy transport. In this connection, Turkey may be a key to watch. Full-text policy article on EEC-CMEA relations (1987) tag:www.robertcutler.org,2007:/blog//1.27 2007-02-14T09:19:40Z 2007-02-14T09:35:02Z "Harmonizing EEC-CMEA Relations: Never the Twain Shall Meet?," International Affairs 63, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 259-70. This article reviews Soviet perspectives on the European Economic Community (as the European Union was then called) in the early 1970s and then covers... Harmonizing EEC-CMEA Relations: Never the Twain Shall Meet?," International Affairs 63, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 259-70. This article reviews Soviet perspectives on the European Economic Community (as the European Union was then called) in the early 1970s and then covers subsequent developments between the two European blocs later in that decade and through the early and mid-1980s. This review culminates in an assessment, consecutively, of the legal, economic, and political aspects of EEC–CMEA relations as these stood in early 1987. The article then establishes four possibilities for future relations between the organizations and evaluates these possibilities. It concludes with an attempt to see into the more distant future. Key Eurocrats in Brussels aver that this analysis strongly influenced EEC policy towards East Central Europe in the late 1980s, while the Soviet empire in East Europe was dissolving but the USSR had not yet begun to disintegrate. It includes 23 explanatory and bibliographical notes incorporating sources and studies in English, French, Russian, and Polish.]]> Azerbaijan tag:www.robertcutler.org,2006:/blog//1.3 2006-11-06T16:21:31Z 2007-01-01T11:51:15Z Azerbaijan's oil exports are set to jump 61 percent to 22.3 million tons in 2006 as the BTC comes online, at least according to BP. Meanwhile a lecture by BP's Chief Scientist responsible for formulating long-term strategy is available on... jump 61 percent to 22.3 million tons in 2006 as the BTC comes online, at least according to BP. Meanwhile a lecture by BP's Chief Scientist responsible for formulating long-term strategy is available on line, and a report of some American views about the relationship between oil and democracy in Azerbaijan (as well as Kazakhstan) is available from Voice of America.]]> Slow Progress on Reforms in Kazakhstan tag:www.robertcutler.org,2006:/blog//1.22 2006-09-27T03:27:52Z 2007-01-08T03:32:08Z Robert Cutler with the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, "The thing to understand about Kazakhstan is that there is political pluralism. But it is extremely restricted to a relatively not very numerous political elite." Slow Progress on Reforms in Kazakhstan" (29 September 2006):
Robert Cutler with the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, "The thing to understand about Kazakhstan is that there is political pluralism. But it is extremely restricted to a relatively not very numerous political elite. There have been opposition movements within this political elite, trying to liberalize things for the simple purpose of economic rationality. And the political conflict is really amongst this political elite. The mere fact that someone you know [as a fellow political elite] can be found murdered creates a little uncertainty and it makes people uneasy. [Opposition leader and former Information Minister Altynbek Sarsenbaev was murdered in February 2006.] There's a sense that something has got to change. But as is often the case, things are not going to change much so long as the autocrat[, Nursultan Nazarbayev,] is still in place."
]]> Playing Oil Politics in the Caspian Sea tag:www.robertcutler.org,2007:/blog//1.23 2006-06-27T04:59:56Z 2007-01-24T11:18:58Z Robert Cutler, a senior fellow at the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, agrees that Russia’s political and economic strength is growing. He says it was clearly demonstrated by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his recent response to the European Union's call to sign on to a multilateral commerce treaty. Playing Oil Politics in the Caspian Sea" (26 June 2006):
Robert Cutler, a senior fellow at the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, agrees that Russia’s political and economic strength is growing. He says it was clearly demonstrated by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his recent response to the European Union's call to sign on to a multilateral commerce treaty.
]]> "Putin," says Professor Cutler,"renounced signing the Transit Protocol of the Energy Charter Treaty, which would have obligated Russia to treat foreign companies the same as Russian companies when it comes to investment and energy exploration. It would have also given non-Russian actors equal access to the Russian pipeline system. He said, 'no dice.'"
Carleton University’s Robert Cutler adds that as long as oil and increasingly natural gas remain to be the lifeblood of modern economies, tension and conflict over energy resources between Russia and much of the rest of the world will likely continue in the Caspian Sea basin.
]]> Politics of Oil Dominate Shanghai Summit tag:www.robertcutler.org,2007:/blog//1.8 2006-06-16T12:07:15Z 2007-01-07T17:31:18Z The underlying purpose of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is for Russia and China to assert their influence in Central Asia. This is especially true of China, with its bid to secure energy resources. Politics of Oil Dominate Shanghai Summit" (16 June 2006):
Analysts say the United States has reason to watch closely for signs of anti-American sentiments at the SCO. Robert Cutler, a senior research fellow at Carleton University in Canada, says the underlying purpose of the organization is for Russia and China to assert their influence in Central Asia. He says this is especially true of China, with its bid to secure energy resources.
]]> "This must be said, that the SCO would not exist without the impetus and the support, both financial and diplomatic, given to it by Chinese diplomacy," said Cutler. "It is very much a tool of Chinese diplomacy to exclude U.S. influence from the region and extend its own economic influence."
Cutler says the SCO maybe able to counterbalance U.S. influence in the region in the long run. He points to the withdrawal last November of U.S. forces from a base in Uzbekistan, and subsequent calls by SCO members for Washington to set a timeline for the departure of remaining American forces in Central Asia. The members meanwhile called for expanded military cooperation among themselves.
]]> Russia Seeks to Rebuild Reputation as Reliable Energy Supplier tag:www.robertcutler.org,2006:/blog//1.21 2006-04-07T03:20:18Z 2007-02-03T10:16:28Z Robert Cutler, an energy specialist at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada says Moscow's action called into question its reputation as a reliable supplier. "The current presidential administration did something that no Soviet leadership ever did during the cold war. They cut off gas," he said. Russia Seeks to Rebuild Reputation as Reliable Energy Supplier" (4 April 2006):
Last January, Russia, unhappy with Kiev's shift to a western oriented foreign policy, threatened to quadruple gas prices for Ukraine and triggered supply disruption. Robert Cutler, an energy specialist at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada says Moscow's action called into question its reputation as a reliable supplier. "The current presidential administration did something that no Soviet leadership ever did during the cold war. They cut off gas," he said.
]]> Cutler and other speakers say the Russian leadership miscalculated in assuming that Europe would agree with Russia that Ukraine caused the disruption by refusing to pay western prices for Russian gas. "Even the fact that this [action] was taken against Ukraine was felt by western Europe. It was a little heavy handed for some political leaders in Moscow to try to blame Ukraine for any shortfalls in Europe. That was taken very badly," he said.]]> Delhi's Options beyond Iran tag:www.robertcutler.org,2006:/blog//1.43 2006-03-28T12:51:36Z 2007-09-30T13:46:55Z When US President George W. Bush was in India this month, he caused a flurry of commentary, especially in the Indian media, by appearing to lift long-standing American objections to the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Iran through... When US President George W. Bush was in India this month, he caused a flurry of commentary, especially in the Indian media, by appearing to lift long-standing American objections to the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India. "Our beef with Iran is not the pipeline," he said in Islamabad. "Our beef with Iran is the fact that they want to develop a nuclear weapon ... We understand that you [Pakistan] need to get natural gas, and that is fine." Yet as recently as mid-January, the United States had reiterated once more its opposition to an Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. A week later, US Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman was in Islamabad to offer clarifications. The US continued to have "serious reservations" about the project. "Other pipeline projects are very good and we are ready to help." If this was not clear enough, a White House National Security Council spokesman added: "As we stated before, the US government does not support the Iran-Pakistan-India [IPI] pipeline. We have repeatedly expressed concerns about international participation in energy projects with Iran." The genie was back in the bottle. Or was it? A project for Indian importation of Iranian gas was first discussed in 1993, when relations with Pakistan were much worse and an undersea pipeline was proposed. This, however, turned out to be much too exorbitant, so Pakistan was eventually brought into play. Islamabad lifted its reticence to let Iranian gas cross its territory to India in early 2000, a few weeks after US president Bill Clinton, visiting India, met there with the Ambani family. The Ambanis run Reliance Industries, a likely buyer of gas from Iran that has built an enormous petrochemical complex in Gujarat state near India's border with Pakistan. Bodman's trip occurred coincidentally only a few days before the first trilateral meeting on the pipeline among the Iranian, Pakistani and Indian sides. Taking place in Tehran, it was supposed to prepare for a trilateral ministerial meeting set for April. Until relatively recently, all contacts had been bilateral, either between Iran and India or between Iran and Pakistan. Last year, however, saw more than a half-dozen India-Pakistan meetings about the pipeline project. Meanwhile, construction costs for the pipeline itself, estimated at almost US$5 billion near the beginning of the decade, have now risen to over $7 billion. Iran insists that India sign a "take-or-pay" contract, meaning that India would be obliged to pay for gas whether the gas was actually imported and consumed. India has coyly suggested a "supply-or-pay" arrangement in which Iran is contractually obligated to deliver gas at the Indian border with Pakistan, or else pay for the quantity not delivered. Further complicating the situation, the gas would be of poor quality. India has asked to receive gas rich in such petrochemicals as butane, propane and ethane; but Tehran has rejected the idea. (This is one of several reasons why the level of Iranian gas exports to Turkey remain relatively low: Tehran insists on selling low-quality gas at high prices.) Also, the sides are still far apart on the price. A year ago, erstwhile Indian petroleum minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, stated that Iran wanted India to pay LNG (liquefied natural gas) rates for regular natural gas. LNG is more expensive because of the cost of liquefaction and subsequent regasification processes. According to Aiyar, the total including transportation and transit fees would be 50% higher than Indian industry was generally willing to pay. Aiyar suggested, moreover, that discounts from the correctly calculated price would be proper for large-quantity purchases. The pricing of natural gas domestically within Pakistan is likewise an issue. The Pakistani government heavily subsidizes that price, and any attempt to raise it would surely provoke unrest. Yet if the pipeline were built, Pakistan, for its part, would reap an estimated $700 million or more per year in transit fees and also get to use the gas domestically. Yet Pakistan is prospecting for natural gas on its own territory and seeks the right not to consume contracted quantities of Iranian gas if it does not need it. Thus Bodman's trip to Islamabad was specifically intended to help provide American technical assistance for prospecting natural gas on Pakistani territory, and so decreasing its need for imports, especially from Iran. The recent agreement whereby the US will help India build nuclear power plants is likewise designed in part to provide groundwork for satisfying India's growing energy demand by means other than Iranian natural gas. In the end, it is far from certain that India need rely on Iran. Recent finds (since 2002) include 57 billion cubic meters (bcm) by Cairn Energy offshore of Andhra Pradesh, 400 bcm by Reliance also offshore of Andhra Pradesh, and 28 bcm by Reliance offshore of Orissa. Importing gas from Bangladesh was an option for India, but Bangladesh did not want to export until domestic supply questions were clarified and reserve figures better calculated. In 2004, Unocal, the lead on the Bangladesh project, lost interest after years of delay. A pipeline from Myanmar across Bangladesh to the Indian state of West Bengal remains a possibility. Shell has contracted to receive LNG supplies from Oman at its terminal in Gujurat. As a result of current conjuncture, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline has been getting a second look. Originally conceived in the mid-1990s, this project was shelved during the Taliban's years in power in Kabul. However, the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict at the beginning of this year finally brought home to President Saparmurat Niyazov Turkmenbashi the danger of Turkmenistan's near-exclusive dependence on Russian pipelines for exports. Although pipeline security in Afghanistan remains at present problematic, recent attacks on energy infrastructure in Pakistani Balochistan (an energy-rich region but one still poor and disfavored by the present government) raise equally the question of the security of an IPI pipeline. An interesting variant of the TAP project sees it extended beyond Pakistan into India. India's natural gas consumption in 2003 was 27.4 bcm, projected to rise to almost 40 bcm by 2010 and over 50 bcm in 2015. However, the growth of demand for natural gas in India is dependent on the domestic power generation industry, which at present is about two-thirds fed by coal, but is projected to be one of the biggest consumers of natural gas. The Electricity Act of 2003 foresees unbundling and eventually privatizing the assets of India's state electricity boards into generation, transmission and distribution companies. Yet the Turkish experience is a noteworthy caution. In the late 1990s, Turkey planned huge increases in natural gas imports during the present decade, while legislating a similar dismantlement of state-owned and state-run electricity enterprises. Turkey went so far as to amend its constitution so that power industry companies were no longer required to be state-owned. However, the process of unbundling and privatization has flagged. As a result, the government in Ankara recently revised significantly downward its projected gas import needs for the remainder of the decade. One should therefore be cautious about projections in the growth of Indian natural gas import requirements, and hence about whether a pipeline from Iran would be necessary or cost-effective, especially given other potential suppliers. The US knows that it cannot veto single-handedly the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan, but it continues to discourage the attempt. In fact, external factors have made such a pipeline impractical until now. In the future, other import options for India and Pakistan, as well as prospecting and resource development on the territories of the two states and developments in their electricity sectors, may well make dependence on Iran unnecessary. Kazakhstan Holds Elections for a New Parliament tag:www.robertcutler.org,2004:/blog//1.37 2004-10-06T06:38:53Z 2007-04-02T09:12:34Z On September 19, Kazakhstan held the first round of elections for a new Majilis (lower parliamentary body). Second-round run-offs are being held on October 3, but the first round already established the contours of the complete results. Important structural impediments to de-authorization and democratization remain, but they are not insurmountable. However, the longer reform is delayed, the more endemic they will become. Central Asia -­ Caucasus Analyst vol. 6, no. 20 (6 October 2004): 5-­6. Copyright © Robert M. Cutler. On September 19, Kazakhstan held the first round of elections for a new Majilis (lower parliamentary body). Second-round run-offs are being held on October 3, but the first round already established the contours of the complete results. In addition to parties formed around the persons of President Nursultan Nazarbaev (Otan) or his daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva (Asar), the technocratic Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) and Ak Zhol, which emerged from it, were among those running candidates. The conduct of the elections was better than in other Central Asian states, but exit polls were diverged markedly from the official results, which give Otan a majority in the chamber. Important structural impediments to de-authorization and democratization remain, but they are not insurmountable. However, the longer reform is delayed, the more endemic they will become. ]]> Background In 1994 Kazakhstan elected its First (post-Soviet) Parliament, on the basis of the country’s first post-Soviet constitution. It was dissolved very soon thereafter when, on the basis of accusation of electoral fraud by one anti-Nazarbaev candidate in a single electoral district, the Constitutional Court ruled the entire parliament to be illegal. President Nursultan Nazarbaev then ruled by decree for over a year. In December 1995 Kazakhstan elected its Second Parliament. Its influence was reduced by a new constitution and by its removal to the new capital Aqmola, subsequently renamed Astana. In October 1999 the country elected its Third Parliament. Its lower house is the now-outgoing Majilis. (The upper house, the Senate, is not elected.) In preparation for the 1999 elections, political formations surviving from 1995 regrouped themselves. The People's Unity Party of Kazakhstan, universally known by its Russian acronym SNEK, amalgamated into the Otan (Fatherland) Party with some smaller parties that were equally pro-Nazarbaev. At the same time two other parties, the Civil Party and the Agrarian Party, no less supportive of the regime and its president, formed out of the regroupings of smaller parties. These three became the largest parties in the Third (1999) Majilis: Otan gained 28 seats, Civil Party 19, and Agrarian Party 9; also represented was the Auyl ("Village") Party likewise with 9; and there were 10 unaffiliated deputies, plus 10 more directly appointed by Nazarbaev himself. Since then Dariga Nazarbaeva, the president's daughter and head of the country's dominant TV-and-press conglomerate, has formed the Asar party, which due to regroupings in the Majilis since 1999 already counted two deputies before elections took place. Running candidates as well in 2004 is the dissident but regime-supportive party Ak Zhol, led by former deputy prime minister Oraz Dzhandosov. Ak Zhol was formed from out of the split of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK) movement after its two other leaders were sentenced to prison on charges widely viewed as politically motivated: Mukhtar Ablyazov, also a former member of Nazarbaev's cabinet and head of the Temirbank financial group, requested and was granted a pardon; while Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, once Nazarbaev's prefect in Pavlodar, was moved to house arrest days before the elections. In the present elections, DCK is running candidates in a bloc with the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK), which survives from the 1995 elections but does not descend even indirectly from the Soviet-era CPK. Also surviving from the 1995 elections are the Agrarian Party and Civic Party, which together formed the AIST bloc for the 2004 elections. Implications Several days before the first-round parliamentary elections held on 19 September 2004, the Institute for Socioeconomic Information and Forecasts in Almaty announced the results of a pre-election poll that it had conducted. Predicting voter turnout at about 60 percent (in the event, it was around 56), the institute's head Sabit Zhusupov also said it would conduct exit polls on the day of the election encompassing no fewer than 400,000 voters (or one in ten of the eventual turnout). A comparison between the pre-election poll and the exit poll is instructive. According to the exit poll, slightly less than one-third of voters had cast ballots for Otan (32.8 percent as against 28.1 in the pre-election poll), slightly more than one-fifth for Ak Zhol (20.9 percent as against 22.9 in the pre-election poll), and slightly more than one-sixth for Asar (17.6 percent as against 24.6 in the pre-election poll). All other parties received fewer than ten percent in the pre-election poll; Zhusupov's exit poll gave the CPK/DCK bloc 8.7 percent, just behind the 9.6 percent received by the AIST bloc. The official first-round results gave 60.6 percent to Otan, followed by Ak Zhol with 12.0 percent, Asar with 11.4 percent, and AIST with 7.1 percent. (A handful of other parties also contested the elections, but the law establishes a threshold of 7 percent to gain representation.) The 77-member Majilis is elected through 67 single-member constituencies and 10 seats elected by party lists. The law mandates a second-round run-off if no candidate receives 50 percent of the vote in a given constituency. Forty-five of the 67 deputies were elected on the first round, and of these 33 are from Otan, nine from AIST, and two from Asar with eight independents. Ak Zhol won representation only through the party-list voting, with one of the ten deputies elected by that method; Otan took seven of the others, with Asar and AIST each also taking one. Otan is thus guaranteed 40 of the 77 seats even before the second round takes place. The CPK/DCK bloc won no seats under either method. The only member of Nazarbaev's cabinet to belong to either Ak Zhol or DCK, the Ak Zhol leader Altynbek Sarsenbaev, appointed July 12 as information minister (a post he held under Nazarbaev for much of the 1990s), resigned in protest against widespread fraud. Russian and CIS observers have stated that the elections were satisfactory, while an official American statement has declared them to be more democratic than past elections in Kazakhstan. The OSCE report took note of improvements over 1999 but remained critical and gave detail of numerous shortcomings, including media bias and voter intimidation. Conclusions One positive factor favoring progress is the ongoing generational change in the Kazakhstani elite that empirical sociological research has established to be taking place. DCK embodies this inevitable movement; it and Ak Zhol grow out of the need for and constituency of younger and technocratic managers. Ak Zhol is well-connected among the ethnic Kazakh business elite that has emerged since independence. However, the extension of Ak Zhol's or DCK's influence and the prospect for ultimate political reform are complicated by the fact that procedures for political decision making remain far from routinized and rationalized. An aide to President Nazarbaev has recently opined that, on the basis of the announced results, Otan should be considered Kazakhstan's "ruling party" and be institutionalized as such. It is not out of the question that a "one-party-dominant" system in Kazakhstan around a pro-presidential (rather than "ruling") party may lead to a genuine multiparty system that culminates in the legitimate alternation of another party in power: Mexico followed a similar pattern in the twentieth century. If that occurs, Kazakhstan's level of social and economic development suggests that it should not be necessary to wait, as did Mexico, many decades for this to come to pass. Also the cultural requisites for a multiparty system are better established in Kazakhstan. A more apposite case would be post-colonial India. There the alternation in power of another party occurred in three decades after independence, a period only twice the present lifetime of sovereign Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the present political system remains highly "presidential" with little substantive role for parliament. The question for Kazakhstan, under its present constitution, is whether the political executive will allow a multiparty system genuinely to emerge. The greatest fundamental restraint on de-authoritarization and democratization in Kazakhstan is continuing restriction upon the growth of socio-economic strata interested in and capable of supporting real alternative parties. There is no growth in Kazakhstan of an upper-middle-class to complement its emerging lower-middle-class. It is still easy to establish a modest small enterprise but much more difficult to expand into, or to establish outright, a more substantial medium-sized enterprise. This results from conscious policy decisions at the highest leadership levels. The second, and related, greatest problem blocking de-authoritarization and democratization is the absence of a public sphere. "Social opinion" exists in Kazakhstan but it would be incorrect to speak of "public opinion," because there are no regular public forums for social opinion to aggregate, manifest politically, and engage in dialogue with officialdom. That is due to the second greatest fundamental restraint on de-authoritarization and democratization in the country. This is the distortion of the media system, which remains under the direct and indirect control of members of the president's family, not least the president's daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva, head of the Asar party. ]]> Karachaganak Gas and the Future of Kazakhstan's Pipeline System tag:www.robertcutler.org,2004:/blog//1.12 2004-09-09T00:17:35Z 2007-01-08T02:53:26Z The Karachaganak energy field sends gas for processing to a Gazprom plant in Orenburg, Russia. The decision where to process oncoming increased Karachaganak volumes has significant implications for future development of Kazakhstan's national pipeline system. Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, vol. 6, no. 18 (8 September 2004): 8-9. Copyright © Robert M. Cutler. SUMMARY: The supergiant Karachaganak energy field, onshore in northwestern Kazakhstan, sends gas for processing over the Russian border to a processing plant in Orenburg operated by Gazprom. Production is slated to increase. The joint operators of the Karachaganak gas venture, BG and ENI, together with the Government of Kazakhstan, are considering building a plant on-site in Karachaganak to process the new volumes. Gazprom argues against this and is trying to offer incentives to send the gas instead to an expanded Orenburg plant. The eventual decision, coming soon, will have significant implications for how Kazakhstan's national pipeline system develops in the future.]]> BACKGROUND The supergiant Karachaganak condensate and gas field, onshore in northwestern Kazakhstan was discovered in 1979. Production began in 1984. After Kazakhstan became independent, BG (formerly British Gas) and Agip acquired rights to negotiate its development. In 1995 they became joint operators of the field (later becoming ENI), and Gazprom also joined the group. Two years later Texaco, now part of ChevronTexaco, acquired a 20% share and Lukoil took over Gazprom's 15% share. Also in 1997 a definitive Production Sharing Agreement was signed. In the Soviet era, the gas that was produced went over the Russian border to Orenburg. BG acquired a 2% stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) when the latter was restructured in 1996. Liquids from Karachaganak began to flow through the CPC pipeline in early 2004 through a pipeline constructed to Atyrau. The field is estimated to be capable of producing 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil. With Karachaganak oil now in the pipeline, CPC is ramping up its capacity to a half-million bpd, and Karachaganak will be the second largest supplier to the CPC. In recent years, the gas has gone to Orenburg and travelled through the Russian pipeline system to the final consumer, more than half of it to Azerbaijan. The company KazRosGaz, a joint venture created in 2002 by Gazprom and Kazakhstan's KazMunaiGaz extracts raw gas from the Karachaganak field and processes it at Orenburg. In 2003 the quantity processed was 5.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) out of 9.5 bcm total Karachaganak gas production, and 7 bcm is the figure projected for 2004 out of 13 bcm total. The third phase of development of the Karachaganak gas field, which is about to begin, seeks to increase production but an additional 8 bcm. But raw gas from Karachaganak has high sulfur content, so it cannot meet contractual specifications as to export quality. This, together with additional propane and butane in the gas, makes for economic losses to the operators, who have long sought to ameliorate the present situation, particularly since they plan to more than triple the current gas production level by the time Karachaganak peaks. IMPLICATIONS Consequently, the operators have for some time been studying a project to build a gas processing plant on the Karachaganak site itself. Such a plant would take sulfur out of the gas and stabilize the condensate. In its first stage it would treat about 4 bcm of gas per year. The plant would then expand to handle larger amounts of gas as production increases in the future. The project on the Karachaganak site, which the Kazakhstani government would appear to prefer if all other things were equal, would eventually be able to process up to 10 bcm annually. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Gazprom executive team believes such a project to be ill-considered. The deputy chairman of Gazprom's board, Aleksandr Riazanov, has called it "rather expensive and currently not market-effective." Gazprom is in the very final stages of formulating a counterproposal to process an additional 8 bcm at Orenburg, equivalent to the projected increase in Karachaganak's gas production during phase three development about to being. According to Gazprom, such an expansion of Orenburg could be accomplished in a maximum of two years at one-quarter of Riazanov's estimated cost of construction the plant at Karachaganak. The Karachaganak on-site project, on the other and, is unlikely to begin construction before 2007. Current forecasts of Karachaganak's gas production see it holding fairly steady, rising to only 15.5 bcm by 2006, 18.9 bcm in 2007, and eventually to 23.7 bcm in 2010. Not all of this gas is produced for consumption, however. Roughly 6 bcm is slated to be pumped back into the ground in order to maintain proper pressure. So there is not enough to feed both Orenburg and the Karachaganak on-site plant. To send the planned gas to Orenburg would require significant expansion of the plant there as well as construction of two new gas pipelines from Karachaganak. Gazprom hints at wishing to become part-owner of any pipeline built from Karachaganak not to Orenburg and even to form a joint venture to expand and modernize Kazakhstan's gas pipeline system. This would give it the right to put its own gas through Kazakhstan's system. Gazprom offers Kazakhstan the opportunity to become part-owner of the Orenburg plant. Although certain industrialists in Kazakhstan are not uninterested in this prospect, it is not certain whether the political authorities would favor such a plan. Also, if Gazprom does not want to finance Orenburg's expansion by itself, this implicitly raises the question how it would finance the more costly Karachaganak plant or its involvement in Kazakhstan's pipeline systems. CONCLUSION Gazprom appears to have an appetite for the pipeline systems of neighboring states. A few years ago it become proprietor of much of Ukraine's network in settlement for financial debts. If Kazakhstan sends much more gas to Orenburg or accedes to Russian participation in its own national infrastructure, then it could find that infrastructure commandeered, to the exclusion of Kazakhstan's own production, by those same Russian companies for transmission to Russia of gas from Turkmenistan, which are slated to increase significantly in the future. On the other hand, if Kazakhstan is able to find other financing for its own pipeline expansion, then it could finally have a card to play when bargaining with Russia in the future, since Turkmenistan's gas exports to Russia rely upon transit across Kazakhstan's territory. The supergiant Karachaganak energy field, onshore in northwestern Kazakhstan, sends gas for processing over the Russian border to a processing plant Orenburg operated by Gazprom. Production is slated to increase. The joint operators of the Karachaganak gas venture, BG and ENI, together with the Government of Kazakhstan, are considering building a plant on-site in Karachaganak to process the new volumes. Gazprom argues against this and is trying to offer incentives to send the gas instead to an expanded Orenburg plant. The eventual decision, coming soon, will have significant implications for how Kazakhstan's national pipeline system develops in the future.]]> Out With the US, In With the Turks tag:www.robertcutler.org,2005:/blog//1.26 2003-03-07T05:08:49Z 2007-01-15T05:18:18Z The Turkish Grand National Assembly, in failing to approve the economic assistance package to be provided to Turkey by the US in return for American troops using Turkish soil for an attack on Iraq, also failed to authorize Turkey's army to enter northern Iraq. The Turkish constitution requires a parliamentary vote to send the country's armed forces outside its own borders. With this not being approved, the dynamics of the impending war have changed. Asia Times OnLine, 07 March 2003. Copyright © Robert M. Cutler. The Turkish Grand National Assembly, in failing to approve the economic assistance package to be provided to Turkey by the US in return for American troops using Turkish soil for an attack on Iraq, also failed to authorize Turkey's army to enter northern Iraq. The Turkish constitution requires a parliamentary vote to send the country's armed forces outside its own borders. With this not being approved, the dynamics of the impending war have changed. ]]> At greatest issue in northern Iraq for the US, of course, are the oil fields of Kirkuk; but they are not the whole story. It would be fair to say that most everyone who actually lives in the region is at least as concerned about the post-Saddam Hussein political order in Iraq, specifically whether the country will be federal or unitary. It was in the attempt to calm Kurdish fears of Turkish occupation, in particular, that President George W Bush's special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad--a protege of deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz who cut his teeth on constructing post-conflict regimes in Afghanistan--met with the assembled Iraqi opposition in northern Iraq this past weekend. Khalilzad's mission was part of the hesitation-waltz between Turkey and the US leading up to the assembly vote on the American economic assistance package, which, unexpectedly, failed to win Turkish parliamentary approval. From the American perspective, Khalilzad's most important tasks were to dissuade the opposition from forming a body that could be taken to represent a provisional government and to get them to acquiesce in a Turkish military incursion. On both counts he was less than successful. Concerning the first of these, the opposition established a leadership council that styles itself as the nucleus of a post-Saddam government, rather than just an advisory council that might work with an American viceroy. Indeed, inside Iraq the opposition is spinning this as suggesting parallel civilian and military administrations. Concerning the second matter, important despite the final statement's relatively soft language, elements within the Iraqi opposition strongly object to any Turkish intervention at all. In fact, Khalilzad's language that the Turkish military role would be "fully coordinated" with the American presence, and that the Turkish army would leave when the Americans did, contains enough holes to drive a truck through. Full coordination does not exclude autonomy: the military planning done within the framework of the US-Turkish agreement put before the Turkish assembly foresaw 80,000 Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq--more than twice the number of Americans--as well as Turkish (or joint US-Turkish) supervision of the subsequent disarmament of the Kurdish forces to be armed by the Americans to assist in the first stages of the war. If the US is now limited to leapfrogging airborne divisions into northern Iraq from the Gulf, which press reports have long suggested to be the American "Plan B", then American troops will be far less numerous than the 40,000 they planned for ground insertion via eastern Turkey. Moreover, with the Ankara parliament's rejection of the terms of the US-Turkish agreement, the American engineering enhancements projected for Turkish bases, which were intended to permit the more rapid transit of US troops through Turkey into Iraq, will not be completed in time if they are completed at all. This constellation of events raises the interesting possibility that, should the Turkish parliament approve a Turkish role in northern Iraq after the de facto leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is elected from the Siirt constituency this weekend and becomes prime minister, then the ratio of Turkish to American troops on the ground in northern Iraq will be far greater than two-to-one. If the US arms the Kurds, as foreseen in the first stages of the invasion, and if Turkey decides after Erdogan forms a government that he could present the motion on military cooperation to parliament again, then the subsequent Turkish introduction of troops into northern Iraq would only enhance the probability of Turkish-Kurdish clashes in the north, where the US may not have the troops effectively available to separate them or establish a ceasefire. In conclusion, one should take note of a secret seldom whispered in the English-language press, that even today there are exiled Iraqi parties that are not sympathetic to the projected American intervention. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a body representing Shi'ite Arabs in southern Iraq and participating in the meetings with Khalilzad but which objected to language "welcoming" American troops, is is one such party. Islamic Call, another Shi'ite group but not present at the Khalilzad meeting, is another. (Islamic Call is also called "Da'wa" in English-language reports, after its Arabic name "al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya".) The Iraqi Communist Party, which was the largest Iraqi party before Saddam achieved power, also opposes US intervention. Finally, even the Kurdistan Democratic Party is split, with memories of previous US betrayals of the Kurds in uprisings in 1975 and 1991 motivating some of its leaders to oppose American intervention if a Turkish invasion is inseparable from it. It is to be noted that these parties represent non-Sunni ethnic groups in the north and south of the country. They may be counted on, especially the Kurds, to insist strongly on a federal post-Saddam Iraq. Washington, meanwhile, seems split between those for whom "nation-building" has passed from political anathema to political practice (if not doctrine) on the one hand, and on the other hand, those who would be happy merely to replace the several dozen super-elite of the Iraqi leadership--many of whom are linked to Saddam by kinship and clan ties--while leaving the unitary Saddamite state apparatus more or less intact and carrying over the vast majority of its officials into the post-Saddam era. Such a political design, however, does not qualify as "regime change": it amounts to nothing less than a coup d'etat. The Turkish Parliament's Double-Fisted Knockout tag:www.robertcutler.org,2003:/blog//1.25 2003-03-05T05:00:35Z 2007-01-15T05:08:15Z Press reports, especially in North America, suggested that a deal between Ankara and Washington [for US use of Turkish territory and airspace for the insertion of American troops into Iraq] was just a question of money, using the metaphor of the bazaar to explain Turkish negotiating behavior. In the end, this description was shown to be ill-conceived and inaccurate. In all the hubbub, few people noticed that the same vote that rejected the American aid package also failed to authorize Turkey's military intervention in northern Iraq. Asia Times OnLine, 05 March 2003. Copyright © Robert M. Cutler. Please see reprint info for information on rights. Press reports, especially in North America, suggested that a deal between Ankara and Washington was just a question of money, using the metaphor of the bazaar to explain Turkish negotiating behavior. In the end, this description was shown to be ill-conceived and inaccurate. More was at stake than just the amount of money. Turkish leaders consistently said so, but no one in Washington seemed to hear them. The American administration also appeared to assume that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara could make its parliamentary deputies fall into line as easily as the Republican Party in the US can whip its congressmen and senators into supporting administration policy. ]]> For weeks, the Turkish and American administrations negotiated back and forth over the content of the assistance package, which was variously reported at either $16 billion or $26 billion. This discrepancy was due to the fact that $1 billion of the outright grant became earmarked as a guarantee for another $10 billion loan that was formally outside the assistance package. Towards the end of the negotiations, some press reports suggested that Turkey had upped its requirements to $32 billion. This misstatement reflected only Ankara's desire for an immediate infusion of cash on the war's very outbreak. Not unreasonably, Turkish leaders contended that the Ankara stock market and the Turkish lira would be hit immediately on the commencement of war, before the assistance package as a whole could be approved by the US Congress and implemented. This dispute was linked to the question, never fully resolved between the two sides, whether the overall package would be subject to conditions of the loan regime established by the International Monetary Fund in its continuing attempts to compel reform of the Turkish economy. Also, Congressional approval would be required for the assistance package, and Washington insisted that that was not possible overnight and would indeed take six to eight weeks. In response, the Turkish government made it clear that it would accept as a guarantee nothing less than a letter signed by President George W Bush. This is not only because oral American promises of assistance in the run-up to the 1991 war proved to be worthless. It was also because oral American promises to then-prime minister Bulent Ecevit 14 months ago, concerning the extension of a free trade agreement with Turkey, turned out to be similarly not followed up: just like oral American promises to Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf to open American markets further to textile imports from Pakistan, as well as oral American promises to Russia's President Vladimir Putin for concrete measures in his favor since September 11 have yielded these leaders no tangible benefits. As the weeks of negotiation followed one after the other, an interesting attitudinal reversal appeared to occur between Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and de facto AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In the beginning it was Gul who was the more concerned with diplomatic initiatives having as their explicit goal to make the US war against Iraq something other than inevitable, and it was Erdogan who was publicly more intent on reaching agreement with the US on an economic package. This was probably because Erdogan felt a need to prove his credentials as a reputable alliance partner, while Gul was more strongly influenced by his connections with the AKP's parliamentary caucus, which was always divided, and remains so, over the question of war with Iraq. As time passed, though, Gul was more and more socialized into his government role and responsibilities, while the prospect of Erdogan's entering parliament via the scheduled by-election in Siirt made him feel more secure and in need of proving less. Indeed, in the iconic photograph following the announcement of the "no to the US" vote in Ankara, it is Gul who, head in hands, appears vexed and Erdogan who has the philosophical air. There are two significant details in all this that have escaped general attention. The first is that the government motion was in fact neither rejected nor adopted. That is because an absolute majority of deputies did not vote either for or against it. It will be recalled that immediately after the 264-251 vote in favor, the resolution was declared adopted. However, the leader of the opposition, the Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal, drew the attention of the speaker of the assembly to Article 96 of Turkish constitution, which reads in relevant part that "the Turkish Grand National Assembly ... shall take decisions by an absolute majority of those present". In light of this provision, and taking account of the 19 abstentions, the speaker Bulent Arinc declared that in fact an absolute majority of those present had not voted in favor and that the motion was therefore not adopted. Because the motion was not rejected, the government may in theory resubmit it at any time. In practice, however, it will not do so in the near future. This is not because Arinc opined that to submit the same motion again without revisions would be "politically incorrect". Rather, it is because to do so and to see the motion again fail to pass would represent the government's loss of a vote of confidence. In a meeting 24 hours after failing to win approval, the AKP leadership was unable to reach agreement on resubmission of the motion. This spelled the effective decision for no quick resubmission. American pressure then led the AKP to clarify that it did not exclude seeking another vote, and would in fact seek one. However, leading party members have stated to the press that this will not happen until at least two to three weeks have passed, not least because of the need for further consultations within the party itself, including wide discussion among its elected representatives. The AKP leadership simply cannot control the votes of its parliamentary members over this issue. That is why there was what in British practice is called a "free vote" in the first place. It now seems probable that there will be no resubmission of such a motion before Erdogan is elected a member of parliament in the by-election in Siirt and is able to form a new government with himself as prime minister. The second result of the Turkish vote that has passed almost unnoticed is its effect on the war planned in northern Iraq and on the future of Iraq as a whole. The motion that was not adopted had two major aspects. The approval of the US economic assistance package was only one of them. The other was authorization for Turkey's army to enter northern Iraq. The Turkish constitution requires a parliamentary vote to send the country's armed forces outside its own borders. The same vote that rejected the American aid package failed to authorize Turkey's military intervention in northern Iraq. The Turkish Military and Northern Iraq tag:www.robertcutler.org,2003:/blog//1.24 2003-02-20T20:03:10Z 2007-01-14T20:19:01Z Press reports have indicated that what separates the United States and Turkey in their negotiations [over conditions for American access to Turkish territory and facilities for military action against Iraq in 2003] the size and nature of the economic package wanted by Ankara. This is partly true, but it is not the whole story, and not even necessarily the most important part of the story. It remains to be seen at what point the national interests of Turkey and the United States may diverge in practice, not only tactically on the ground but also strategically in the political aftermath of the war. Asia Times OnLine, 20 February 2003. Copyright © Robert M. Cutler. Press reports have indicated that what separates the United States and Turkey in their negotiations [over conditions for American access to Turkish territory and facilities for military action against Iraq in 2003] the size and nature of the economic package wanted by Ankara. This is partly true, but it is not the whole story, and not even necessarily the most important part of the story. Military aspects of any Turkish incursion into northern Iraq and political aspects of northern Iraq's future are, rather, the more significant sticking points. Before discussing the latter, it is nevertheless useful background to review how the level of the economic package has recently increased. ]]> Ten days ago the first press reports appearing in American sources mentioned a size of US$15 billion for the economic package. This figure increased to $20 billion before Turkish politicians declared even this insufficient on the weekend and postponed the planned February 18 parliamentary vote on the presence of American soldiers on Turkish soil to prepare for the invasion of northern Iraq. Following intensive negotiations by the two sides at the highest levels, the figure next quoted in the press was $26 billion. This number was qualified as the final American offer. But even agreement on a number would not be enough to seal a deal, for the composition of the package is also disputed. The US is offering direct grants of about $6 billion, with the remainder composed of loans and trade concessions. However, Western diplomats in Ankara are quoted as saying that Turkey is seeking $10 billion in grants, $15 billion in credits and loans, and nearly $7 billion more in forgiveness of military debts. (Reported figures that approach $50 billion probably include the value of Turkish participation in postwar reconstruction projects in Iraq.) The subtext of statements by Turkish government leaders indicates that Ankara may not consider the deal sealed until it is voted by the US Congress, which must approve it for the agreement to be legally binding on the executive branch. But settling the economic package may be the easy part. Likewise 10 days ago, there were reports of a tacit US-Turkish-Kurdish agreement that would permit between 10,000 and 20,000 Turkish troops to enter northern Iraq, ostensibly to secure a strip of Iraqi territory shadowing the border, so preventing (nonexistent) Kurdish pretensions to political independence in northern Iraq from bearing fruit. In fact, the purpose of this deployment would have been to hunt down armed PKK remnants that withdrew into northern Iraq when the PKK dissolved itself in the late 1990s and then re-formed itself as KADEK, focusing on social action in Turkey rather than armed struggle. According to that tacit agreement, American troops would march on Mosul and Kirkuk, and Turkish and Kurdish elements would agree not to attempt to enter the cities, while the Turks would reserve the right to do so if the Kurds did. This agreement was indeed so tacit that a three-way meeting presided over in Turkey by Zalmay Khalilzad, President George W Bush's special envoy to the Iraqi opposition, broke up without manifest agreement, and with the Americans reduced to warning both other parties simply to stay away from the two cities concerned. Relations between the Turkish authorities and the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) have progressively worsened since then, while Washington's positive rapport with the KDP has created a bone of conflict with Ankara. The first figure circulated in reports--of 10,000 to 20,000 Turkish troops in northern Iraq--became inflated to 38,000 in later reports last week. This is about the same as the number of American soldiers projected to occupy northern Iraq. Thirty-eight thousand Turkish soldiers would be enough to restrict severely, if not eliminate, the autonomy of action of the Iraqi-Kurdish KDP headquarters in Irbil. As the economic deal faltered, press reports in Turkey alluded to plans by the country's military general staff to put in fact twice that number of Turkish soldiers--a full 76,000--into northern Iraq, from where they would march literally halfway to Baghdad. This number of Turkish troops could exert significant political and strategic pressure on all the major cities in the KDP canton: not only Irbil (as well as Dohuk) but also the area around Mosul--the nominal capital of Iraqi Kurdistan under the joint KDP-PUK regime in the 1990s--not to mention a major segment of the pipeline taking oil from Kirkuk to Turkey's port at Ceyhan. And still the dimension and extent of Turkey's military deployment in northern Iraq is not the last sticking point. The Turkish press has in the past few days given acute voice to the indignation felt by Turkish military staff over apparent American insistence, or perhaps naive assumptions, that Turkish troops in northern Iraq would be under US command. Perhaps in response to this, hints were made as recently as Tuesday in Ankara that Turkish troops could enter northern Iraq with their own battle plan and their own military objectives. Part of this misunderstanding between the two sides may have been an initial American assumption that the US-Turkish campaign in northern Iraq would have a NATO aegis, creating the possibility for American command leadership of Turkish troops. But the Turks were not pleased by this assumption, which outlived NATO unity over military assistance to Turkey. As of late Tuesday, Andalou Press Agency reported that the US and Turkey had "made progress in political aspects of negotiations and they partially reached an agreement on [the] 'command' issue". This may involve allowing Turkish troops a privileged place in Kirkuk, where Ankara claims special concern with the Turkmen in the city, or even Mosul itself, but more probably Irbil. (Irbil and Kirkuk are by population the two major Turkmen cities in Iraq.) This was not to be a reversal of the original Turkish-Kurdish understanding over the mutual non-intervention agreement, brokered by the US but which fell apart at the meeting presided by Khalilzad. That is because Kirkuk would be in the canton of northern Iraq controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which--in contrast with the KDP--has had very good relations with Turkey ever since dropping support for the PKK some years back. And yet the final outcome is still undetermined. American troop ships will arrive in the region before too long, and they will have to know by then where to go when they get there. The Pentagon has an undivulged date by which they must know whether Turkey is available as a staging-area/launching-pad, and on which date they will have to begin implementing backup plans if it is unavailable: which still would not mean that Turkey would not intervene unilaterally in northern Iraq. Even if some sort of joint US-Turkish command were established--which is far from being certain--nothing prevents the Turkish military from pursuing its own objectives in northern Iraq. Indeed, this is to be expected and has regularly been declared by both military and political leaders in Ankara. It may be expected, further, that regardless of any cooperation between the two sides, actual Turkish war goals in Iraq will be made no more transparent to the Americans, than the Americans have made their own war planning to the Turks. It remains to be seen at what point the national interests of Turkey and the United States may diverge in practice, not only tactically on the ground but also strategically in the political aftermath of the war. The first evident conflict regarding the latter will come when the Turks will push for the Iraqi Turkmen to be given a prominent role in a post-Saddam Iraqi government, whereas the Turkmen have been marginalized in the planning by Iraqi exiles and expatriates as well as by the American sponsors of the latter. That is when the military situation on the ground in northern Iraq after the end of hostilities will first show its political significance for Baghdad. Interview on Chechen Terrorism tag:www.robertcutler.org,2002:/blog//1.44 2002-11-02T16:42:31Z 2007-10-04T16:52:31Z Transcript of radio interview, evening of 2 November 2002, with John Batchelor on "Batchelor & Alexander", WABC (New York).... Transcript of radio interview, evening of 2 November 2002, with John Batchelor on "Batchelor & Alexander", WABC (New York). Question: The reports today out of Moscow say that Aslan Maskhadov, the president of Chechnya, is a wanted man and has gone into hiding. Answer: Yes, you may recall that it was alleged that Maskhadov was behind the hostage-taking. The first documented source for this assertion was a telephone call by the head of the hostage-takers Movsar Baraev with a media outlet in Azerbaijan, in which he was asked specifically whether Maskhadov knew anything about it, and he answered that, yes, Maskhadov was the leader and was in on all the planning. This made Maskhadov a political outcast in Moscow. Of course, official Moscow was looking for a reason not to deal with him, was in fact not dealing with him, and now they have best reason of all, this being a declaration by chief hostage-taker Baraev that Maskhadov was behind it all; although there are reasons to doubt that statement. It is more likely that Maskhadov knew what was going on and was unable to stop it. Question: Why would the Russian government be interested in discrediting Maskhadov? Answer: The Russian Federation has its own administrative unit for Chechnya, sort of like Northern Ireland when Northern Ireland was under British "direct rule." In this set-up, there is an envoy of the Russian president with his own authority given by Moscow. That is why they don't recognize Maskhadov's authority and would like to see him disappear politically. Question: Exactly who is Maskhadov? Answer: He is a former field commander during the 1994-1996 Russian war in Chechnya, who was elected in 1997 as president of what they call the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. It's necessary to add to what you've already said, that it's not only the Kremlin that would like to see Maskhadov sidelined. There are other Chechens both inside and outside Chechnya who would also like to see him disappear. Question: So if Maskhadov wasn't behind the hostage-taking, then who was? Answer: There is at present no reason to discount the claim of Shamil Basaev, a Chechen warlord linked to Wahabbist sects in Saudi Arabia who has always dissented from Maskhadov's government and frequently been opposed to him personally, particularly during the period between the two Chechen wars, 1996-1999, which is when the kidnapping became really big business. One of the biggest in the business, by the way, and the one with the most brutal reputation was Arbi Baraev. Question: Baraev? Wasn't he the chief hostage-taker? Answer: That was Movsar Baraev, his nephew. Arbi Baraev was an uncompromising enemy of Maskhadov who died in mysterious circumstances in 1999, so this also raises questions about the latter's complicity in Movsar Baraev's actions in Moscow. Indeed, in the theater itself Movsar Baraev was in cellphone touch with his uncle's associate Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, and texts of their conversations were made available by the chief Chechen separatist ideologue Movladi Udugov. Along with Basaev, Yandarbiev and Udugov were opponents of Maskhadov during the late 1990s, and at least Yandarbiev is reported to be living at present in Qatar. In this connection, bear in mind that it was the Qatar-based television channel Al-Jazeera that broadcast videotape of Movsar Baraev and his group in front of an Arabic-language banner declaring their anticipation of becoming martyrs. Moscow has now demanded Yandarbiev's extradition from Qatar, in addition to the extradition of Maskhadov's associate Akhmed Zakaev from Denmark. Question: There's an opinion poll out in Moscow that says 85% of those questioned approve the way Putin's dealt with the crisis, and only 10% disapprove. Also, I recall that the authorities ordered a Russian television station off the air for broadcasting Chechen rebel statements, and they have forced a newspaper to take an interview off their website. Yet the Russian public seems to support this. Answer: This is what happens in any country where a national tragedy occurs with great loss of life that traumatizes the population. The political authorities use the opportunity to enforce control over either a willing or an unwilling media system. Given the recent evolution of domestic politics in Russia, this is no surprise. You may recall the names of people like Gusinsky and Berezsovsky, the "oligarchs" under Yeltsin. Some of them were big media wheels, but under Putin they have gradually been forced to relinquish the levers of information. It is also worth noting that Putin has ordered the responsible government ministries to revise the country's national security doctrine so that it's almost a carbon copy of what recently came out of the Bush administration in the U.S. The Russian defense minister stated on October 29, after coming out of a meeting with Putin, that Russia would strike anywhere anytime against "terrorists, those who finance and inspire them, and their accomplices." ]]>