Robert M. Cutler on Energy and Eurasia

Robert M. Cutler on Energy and Eurasia tag:www.robertcutler.org,2010:/blog//1 2010-02-23T18:09:55Z Movable Type 3.33 Ukrainian Elections Complicate Southern Energy Corridor tag:www.robertcutler.org,2010:/blog//1.276 2010-02-17T16:40:48Z 2010-02-23T18:09:55Z

Viktor Yanukovych came first in the presidential elections in Ukraine, but Yuliya Tymoshenko has instructed lawyers to bring to the courts evidence of voting irregularities to put Yanukovych’s margin of victory under question. Even if the latter is able to muster a negative majority to oust her from office and form his own parliamentary majority, he may be forced to call new parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, he has already moved on the energy front through floating new proposals, if not yet able to offer them formally for legislative consideration. The elections in Ukraine change the odds also for other projects in the east-west energy corridor from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe. BACKGROUNDstrong> An international energy conference was held in Batumi, Georgia, in mid-January, originally planned as a high-level summit. However, the timing ended up putting it just before the first round of presidential elections in Ukraine, and very late in the game President Viktor Yushchenko decided not to attend, in order to pursue his ill-fated campaign. Other heads of state subsequently cancelled for protocol reasons, and the meeting went ahead as a preparatory conference for the postponed, yet to be rescheduled, high-level summit. This conference identified two priority projects for further promotion: the reversal of the Odessa-Brody Pipeline for oil (OBP, sometimes now called Sarmatia) back to its originally intended southeast-to-northwest direction inside Ukraine, and the international White Stream natural gas pipeline. The results of the elections in Ukraine and the current situation hold implications for both these projects, as well as for the Russian-sponsored Nord Stream and especially South Stream natural gas pipelines. The White Stream gas pipeline proposes a way for Caspian Sea basin natural gas that passes neither through Russia nor through Turkey on its way to Europe. It seeks to route the gas across Azerbaijan and Georgia to Supsa, then under the Black Sea, for delivery to the Balkan member-states of the EU, notably Romania (at the port of Constanta), and then from there further westwards. In particular, the EU feasibility study of White Stream projects that the gas pipeline, after making landfall in the Balkans, would extend overland to Italy along the route of the Pan-European Oil Pipeline. It would be possible for Azerbaijan alone to supply the 8 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) called for in White Stream’s first stage: construction could begin in 2012 and the pipeline could enter into service in 2015. The other project discussed at Batumi is the reversal of the OBP and its extension into Poland to the port of Gdansk for export by way of the refinery at Plock. At the time of its conception, the OBP was intended to receive oil from Kazakhstan through the Georgian ports of Batumi and Kulevi to the Ukrainian port of Kherson. The decision was taken to pursue construction in the absence of supply guarantees; the pipeline lay empty from its completion in 2001 until 2004, when another decision was taken to reverse the intended flow so as to take Russian oil from the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline towards the southeast inside Ukraine. This pipeline inside Ukraine was integrated into the Euro-Asian Oil Transportation Corridor (EAOTC) agreed among Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine in May 2008. Under the concept endorsed in Batumi, the EAOTC would be implemented by sending oil through the Druzhba pipeline to the Kralupy refinery in the Czech Republic while the work was under way to extend the OBP through Poland. That oil (like the first gas for White Stream) would come first of all from Azerbaijan, as President Ilham Aliev three years ago indicated its readiness to supply the crude necessary for the EAOTC project, including the reversal (or, actually, re-reversal) of OBP. IMPLICATIONS During the run-up to the election, Yanukovych promised to seek ways for Ukraine to “participate” in the Russian-based Nord Stream (Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea) and South Stream (Russia to Bulgaria under the Black Sea) natural gas pipeline projects. This was, among other things, a reference to orders for pipeline production either by enterprises of the Interpipe Group (connected with his close associate Viktor Pinchuk) or, still more likely, the Khartsyzsk Pipe Plant (now part of the Metinvest Group, itself the major part of Rinat Akhmetov’s wholly-owned holding company System Capital Management). It was implicitly part of the deal with Germany that German industry would receive an order for the manufacture of the Nord Stream pipeline (Germany also becomes Russia’s monopsonistic gas distributor in northern Europe), but the Khartsyzsk plant is also close to state-of-the-art, its pipes having been used for the Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey. Yet observers suggest that Yanukovych would not wish to see South Stream built, because this would decrease the throughput of gas from Russia to Europe. But it is designed to transit the Turkish rather than the Ukrainian sectors of the Black Sea, so he cannot stop it on that account. Therefore he has in the last few days revived the idea of making Gazprom co-owner of the Ukrainian gas-transport system, perhaps inducing Russia to decrease the market prices that Ukraine is now forced to pay, and also seeking to induce it to help modernize the country’s system. Given that Gazprom has little capital to invest even in its own modernization, however, this does not seem a reasonable hope. Perhaps for that reason, he does not also exclude the participation of European companies in a consortium still to be defined. (In order to do any of this, it would be necessary to amend 2006 legislation written by Tymoshenko as prime minister, and for which his Party of Regions voted at the time.) Yushchenko signed a decree in May 2009 to implement the reversal of the OBP back to its originally planned southeast-to-northwest direction. In December that year, in the run-up to the first round of the election, Yushchenko predicted that the EAOTC would lie dormant, without the OBP being reversed back to its originally intended flow, if either Tymoshenko or Yanukovych were head of government. This is probably so. Although the Pryvat Group behind the OBP supported Yushchenko and Tymoshenko together during the Orange Revolution, its principals fell out with the latter in 2008. Ukraine’s original 2004 decision to reverse the flow of oil to west-to-east came only three days after a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, but in November 2006 the latter publicly endorsed Yushchenko’s new proposal for an extension to Kralupy in the Czech Republic, as a first stage towards realizing the Plock-Gdansk flow. Today, however, Yanukovych has no apparent reason to favor the (re)reversal of the OBP when the Adria pipeline (running from Croatia’s port of Omisalj on the Adriatic Sea to Hungary) is itself a candidate for reversal to an east-to-west direction, giving the southern Druzba pipeline (running through Ukraine and from which OBP at present descends) a new export outlet on the Adriatic Sea. CONCLUSIONS In this fluid context, White Stream seems to be the major project in the EU’s Southern Corridor strategy that has the best prospect for (relatively) unhindered development. One variant of this project includes the pipeline’s interconnection with the domestic Ukrainian pipeline system en route to the Balkans. Yanukovych’s presidency would make this variant unlikely; the project could nevertheless proceed. By the time Azerbaijan’s gas begins to reach Romania, development of gas resources from Turkmenistan (offshore or onshore sites to be identified) and/or Kazakhstan (offshore Kashagan deposit) could make it feasible to consider additional White Stream strings bringing the project up to 24-32 bcm/y later in the decade, not excluding still further expansion in the further future. Its advantage is that it crosses neither through Turkey nor Russia, removing both potential geo-economic bottlenecks. It is worth noting that the White Stream project was included in May 2009 (Prague Summit) as part of the EU’s Southern Corridor strategy alone with the Nabucco pipeline and the Italy-Turkey-Greece Interconnector (ITGI). Competing with White Stream are various liquefied natural gas (LNG) and compressed natural gas (CNG) projects for crossing the Black Sea from Georgia. Indeed, Azerbaijan already last year signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Bulgaria for the export of 1 bcm/y as from 2011 with an eventual target of 8 bcm/y. CNG technology has not been used for such large-scale transportation before and its tankers are more expensive than those for LNG. But CNG does not require expensive gasification and de-gasification infrastructure. The Batumi energy conference in January discussed specific projects for construction of CNG terminals although not LNG. Industry analysts are currently at work calculating and verifying costs of transport, which will likely govern which technology may be chosen in the long run. In view of Europe’s long-term growth in demand for natural gas, it is not to be excluded that more than one technology and more than one route are developed and implemented as time goes by.]]> Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline Becomes a Reality tag:www.robertcutler.org,2010:/blog//1.277 2010-02-03T18:05:55Z 2010-02-23T19:13:58Z

The opening of the first segment of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline last month is only one in a series of recent events in Caspian Sea basin energy developments. It signifies Turkmenistan’s first real moves to break its dependence upon Gazprom and the Russian state for international sales of its energy resources. These developments are to the detriment of Europe, which remains dependent upon Russia and Turkey as transit countries and has been unable to push forward the implementation of its Nabucco pipeline project. BACKGROUND The idea of building a pipeline from Turkmenistan to China goes back to the early 1990s, when international energy companies began to contemplate prospects for the development of Central Asian resources for export to world markets. At the time, however, a lack of experience in the field, the enormous distance to be covered (it would have to transit both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan en route), doubts about the unproven resources despite rumors of enormous quantities, and the isolation imposed by Turkmenistan’s erstwhile president Saparmurad Niyazov all militated against the development of the project. Even the combination of the decline in the country’s exports throughout much of the 1990s, its total dependence upon Russia’s pipeline system, and the low prices received from Russia relative to commercial world rates did not accelerate Ashgabat’s inclination to pursue this project, or indeed to pursue any international pipeline at all (other than one for relatively small volumes to northeastern Iran for domestic consumption there). As other projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline were realized in the meantime, and the possibility of using third countries for transit became established, the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline project was not forgotten. China in the meantime built the West-East Gas Pipeline (WEGP) from Xinjiang to Shanghai, first of all to carry gas from Xinjiang itself, but also to establish the feasibility and the path for subsequent pipelines along the same route. The construction of an oil pipeline from eastern Kazakhstan into Xinjiang (now being extended westward piece by piece to the Caspian Sea basin) established as Beijing’s gateway to Central Asian energy resources. The idea of a 4,500-mile pipeline from eastern Turkmenistan to the Chinese coast no longer seemed so outlandish. In April 2006, Niyazov himself signed a framework cooperation agreement for the project with China’s President Hu Jintao in Beijing. He died eight months later in December, but the project did not lack follow-through. By July 2007, Niyazov’s successor Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov had consolidated his power enough to travel to Beijing in order to witness an agreement between the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Turkmengaz for the pipeline’s construction. IMPLICATIONS One of the reasons why the pipeline project was able to take off so quickly is that it constitutes an add-on to a slightly more modest project, which CNPC had been negotiating with KazMunaiGaz for the import of natural gas from Kazakhstan. Thus the pipeline from Turkmenistan, which was originally planned for a volume of 30 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y), will now be constructed to carry 40 bcm/y (if not still more in later stages), even though China is set to receive only 30 bcm/y from the start. Kazakhstan will generate the other 10 bcm/y and will also consume at least a fraction of that quantity. Indeed, the first phase of the larger project sets a volume target of 10 bcm/y. Whereas a second stage of the original Kazakhstan-China pipeline was planned to increase Kazakhstan's exports to China to 30 bcm/y, it is now likely that at least some of that gas will go to the populous South Kazakhstan province. In the larger project, the Turkmenistani segment will run 190 kilometers (km) from the Bagtiyarlyk cluster in the eastern part of the country to the border with Uzbekistan, then 520 km across Uzbekistan, and another 1,300 km through Kazakhstan to the Chinese border, then through Xinjiang all the way across the country to Guangdong province and Shanghai. Within China, work on a second WEGP parallel to the first was begun in late 2008 for the purpose of making this project possible. Chinese geologists estimate that the Bagtiyarlyk fields that will supply the pipeline hold 1.6 trillion cubic meters of gas altogether. The operating fields of Samandepe and Altyn Asyr will feed the project with 10 bcm/y in the first phase of development and 13 bcm/y when complete. The second phase will add 17 bcm/y to the original 10 bcm/y from deposits that the two sides are developing together in accord with the July 2007 contract, which is structured as a production sharing agreement. The route will involve refurbishing and expanding the Bukhara-Tashkent pipeline inside Uzbekistan and building the route through Almaty to Kazakhstan’s border with China, probably to Alashankou, which is where the aforementioned Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline crosses into China. The sale price for Turkmenistani gas to China has not been published, but credible sources report that it is “over US$100” per thousand cubic meters. Much of the gas to China from Kazakhstan may come from the latter’s Karachaganak deposit, which has not been able to expand volumes until now due to Russia’s inability or unwillingness to honor a three-year-old agreement to expand the capacity of the Orenburg gas processing plant in southern Siberia, or later from the offshore Kashagan deposit. It seems likely to come in the first instance from Aqtobe, where the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has been present for the better part of a decade, via Kzyl-Orda and Shymkent to Almaty and Alashankou. The opening of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline comes at almost the same time as that of an extension of the existing Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline that will expand existing volumes, and a new agreement with Russia to refurbish the East-West Pipeline running across the south of Turkmenistan as well as the Turkmenistani segment of the Caspian Coastal (sometimes called “Pre-Caspian”) Pipeline. Even though skepticism is called for concerning the projects with Russia (earlier similar agreements have had no result), what is clear is that Turkmenistan is moving strongly beyond its dependence on Gazprom. In that connection, it should be noted that at the end of last month Turkmenistan awarded a US$9.7 billion contract to a consortium of companies from China, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea for the development of the large South Yolotan gas field. The British auditing firm Gaffney Cline last year estimated that this field holds 6 trillion cubic meters of gas, with a low estimate of 4 trillion and a high estimate of 14 trillion. In connection with the pipeline just opened to China, Beijing agreed to lend Ashgabat US$4 billion, and three-quarters of this sum will go to developing South Yolotan. Given the speed with which the first Turkmenistan-China pipeline was constructed, there is little reason to doubt that this project will equally see the light of day sooner rather than later. CONCLUSIONS Together with the fact that Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have all now granted permits for the Nord Stream (Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea) pipeline to traverse their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), these most recent developments in Asia underline that Europe continues to miss opportunities to decrease its dependence on Russian sources of natural gas. At the same time, the failure of Turkey to come to terms with Azerbaijan concerning bilateral gas sale arrangements has complicated their negotiations over Nabucco-related matters. Turkey’s favor towards Nabucco’s competitor, the Russia-proposed South Stream pipeline (in return for Russia’s acquiescence in the construction of a trans-Anatolian pipeline from Samsun on the Black Sea to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea), means that Ankara now takes lessons from Moscow as to how gas transit countries to Europe should act. Continuing bilateral consultations between the countries at the highest level, one just last week, underline that such an energy entente is real. An alternative is the White Stream gas pipeline project, now included as part of the EU’s Southern Corridor Strategy, which would convey Caspian Sea gas across Azerbaijan and Georgia and under the Black Sea directly to the EU, but its full development depends on finding a way to get Turkmenistani gas to Azerbaijan for transshipment.]]> Zoning In on Greece tag:www.robertcutler.org,2010:/blog//1.274 2010-01-15T15:06:32Z 2010-02-21T16:10:16Z

The fiscal crisis between Athens and Brussels puts EU credit and currency problems in the spotlight....

The fiscal crisis between Athens and Brussels puts EU credit and currency problems in the spotlight. Early Warning Signs Even before the present crisis, according to European Commission analyses, Greece was the lowest-rated country in the eurozone due to its increasing budget deficit, decreasing competitiveness and increasing public debt (which is about two-thirds of total external debt and by itself equal to one year's GDP). Accordingly, the IMF had warned in mid-2009 that any medium-term recovery in Greece was likely to be hampered by weak competitiveness, large external imbalances and the need to cut the fiscal deficit to limit risks. That situation can only worsen now, as economic slowdown exacerbates of the burden of the country's euro-denominated debt. The resulting wave of private defaults could even spill over into the public sector. New EU President Herman Van Rompuy has stated that Greece’s problems were of concern to the whole EU, and he has expressed confidence that Greece was beginning to address those problems. By this he means to endorse the new government's plan to grant its statistics office full independence and create a commission to investigate its shortcomings with the assistance of Eurostat, the EU's statistical office. The new government's finance minister, George Papaconstantinou, suggests that a combination of failure to enforce tax-collection measures combined with pre-election spending accounts at least in part for the newly reported increase in the state budget deficit. His good will and good faith may be assumed, given his background as an economist and professional work in the OECD. The problem is that, given past experience, it is difficult for anyone in Brussels to take seriously whatever new figures he announces. "Inherent in the system" The IMF has already within the last year provided such help to countries in the region afflicted by similar problems, including EU members seeking to join the eurozone such as Latvia, and also non-members such as Iceland. Consequently, there is extreme political sensitivity on all sides over the IMF mission that is visiting Athens this week, ostensibly to provide technical assistance in the reform of the taxation system and statistical agencies. As the Financial Times's Martin Wolf explained last week, the crisis in Greece not only cannot be organically separated from the crisis in the rest of “the eurozone's periphery” (including Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), but moreover is “inherent in the system.” Those countries, in Wolf's analysis, cannot easily sustain current fiscal deficits or kickstart private sector borrowing or generate an external surplus. There is no eurozone 'hegemon' to rescue them. Speculation is rife in the financial markets that Greece will ultimately require an international bailout that Brussels has already declined to provide. The IMF is the logical lender. This is why Greece, for all its idiosyncratic aspects, is not a special case but, it is feared, only the tip of the iceberg. First published in ISN Security Watch, 15 January 2010.]]> Caspian Diplomacy Should Intensify tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.271 2009-12-01T13:52:14Z 2010-01-05T13:58:44Z

For over 15 years the U.S. has worked to promote cooperation over energy issues among the newly independent states in the Caspian Sea region. A proclaimed goal of U.S. energy policy in the region since the early 1990s has been to make certain that countries in the region do not have to depend upon any single export route that could easily be squeezed off. English original of "Kaspickú diplomaciu je nutné zintenzívniť," first published in Euro-Atlantic Quarterly (Banská Bystrica), vol. 4, no. 4 (October–December 2009): 51.]]> <![CDATA[Kaspickú diplomaciu je nutné zintenzívniť]]> tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.270 2009-12-01T13:30:12Z 2010-02-21T18:00:21Z

UE; viac ako 15 rokov sa Spojené štáty usilujú zintenzívniť kooperáciu medzi nezávislými krajinami kaspického regiónu v oblasti energetiky. Od začiatku 90. rokov je cieľom americkej energetickej politiky zabezpečiť, aby tieto krajiny nezáviseli len od jednej vývoznej trasy, ktorá by mohla byť ľahko prerušená.

]]> Európa – ktorá už raz namietala proti americkým záujmom v kaspickom regióne v neopodstatnenom presvedčení, že by Spojené štáty mohli dosiahnuť výhodnú dohodu s Moskvou, ktorú si nechceli rozhnevať – oceňuje túto stratégiu, keďže boli jej obyvatelia v zime vystavení mrazu v dôsledku ruského uzatvorenia plynových kohútikov Ukrajine. Rusko malo v polovici 90. rokov príležitosť dokázať svoju dobrú vôľu voči Európe podpísaním Energetickej charty. Nanešťastie, väčšina členov výboru Dumy, ktorý bol poverený ratifikáciou zmluvy, reflektovala záujmy priemyselnej byrokracie, v dôsledku čoho bola zmluva zamietnutá. Prezident Jeľcin sa ju neskôr pokúsil implementovať pomocou dekrétov, no neuspel. Avšak americká stratégia nemusí nutne obísť či izolovať Rusko, pokiaľ Moskva nebude presvedčená, že to je cieľom Spojených štátov.

Nie je napríklad všeobecne známe, že americké veľvyslanectvo v Kazachstane spolupracovalo v 90. rokoch s Ruskom, s cieľom reštrukturalizovať Kaspické ropovodné konzorcium, aby tak – v súčasnosti už funkčný – ropovod mohol viesť zo západného Kazachstanu cez juh Ruska až do Čierneho mora. Veľmi obrým príkladom, a zároveň najväčším známym úspechom princípu spoločných vývozných trás – ponúkajúc flexibilitu producentom rovnako, ako aj konzumentom – je ropovod Baku – Tbilisi – Čejhan (BTC), vďaka ktorému Azerbajdžan distribuuje energiu nielen do Ruska, ale aj do iných krajín. Ďalším príkladom je menej známy Kazašsko-kaspický transportný systém (KCTS), odsúhlasený Azerbajdžanom minulý rok, ktorý by mal prispievať ropou z Kazachstanu na východnom pobreží Kaspického mora do BTC, prípadne iných regionálnych ropovodov.

Príspevkom do KCTS by mal byť aj plyn zahraničného kašaganského depozitára, ktorý by bol určený pre európske trhy prostredníctvom Azerbajdžanu a Turecka. Možnosťou je aj príspevok plynu z Turkménska, ktorý by bol alternatívou k Transkaspickému plynovodu, ktorý sa momentálne plánuje ako súčasť projektu Nabucco.

Avšak Spojené štáty nie sú jedinou krajinou, ktorá v tomto regióne sleduje isté ciele, a ktorá zároveň disponuje prostriedkami na ich realizáciu. Začiatkom augusta podpísali turecký premiér Recep Tayyip Erdogan s ruským premiérom Vladimírom Putinom dohodu o vybudovaní „South Stream“ plynovodu, ktorým by sa mal dodávať plyn z kaspického regiónu do Európy. Na podpisovaní sa zúčastnil aj taliansky premiér Silvio Berlusconi, nakoľko sa na projekte podieľajú aj talianske energetické spoločnosti. Rusko navyše podpísalo ďalšiu dohodu, zaväzujúcu k vybudovaniu ropovodu „Samsun – Čejhan“ z tureckého pobrežia Čierneho mora na jeho pobrežie Stredozemného mora, ktorá je podľa tlačových správ vítaná predovšetkým zo strany priemyselníkov, úzko spätých s tureckou politickou elitou. Týmto to pripomína korupčný škandál v rezorte energetiky okolo plynovodu „Blue Stream“ – vedúceho z Turecka cez Čierne more do Ruska – keď bolo Turecko vystavené ostrej kritike súvisiacej so zvýšenou energetickou závislosťou krajiny od Ruska.

Rusko-turecká dohoda o vybudovaní plynovodu South Stream prichádza iba niekoľko týždňov po záväzku Turecka participovať na Európou financovanom projekte Nabucco, ktorý vedie síce inou trasou, no v podstate rovnako odčerpáva plyn z kaspického regiónu v prospech európskych krajín. Oba projekty medzi sebou roky súperili na poli médií či rôznych konferencií, no až teraz začína rivalita naberať na intenzite. Kaspický región nedisponuje dostatkom plynu pre oba projekty, je teda viac než nepravdepodobné, že sa oba budú môcť zrealizovať. Pôvodné tvrdenia Spojených štátov v 90. rokoch o energetickom bohatstve kaspického regiónu sa doteraz nenaplnili. Už takmer pred desiatimi rokmi – pri Kašaganskom nálezisku, najväčšom od objavenia náleziska v Prudhoe Bay na Aljaške v 60. rokoch – vyšlo najavo, že pôvodný prevládájúci skepticizmus bol chybný.

Na prelome storočia nebolo pochýb, že kaspický región bude prinajmenšom „kolísajúcim producentom“, zabezpečujúcim stabilné ceny energií aj v prípade výkyvov produkcie inde vo svete. Teraz je už jasné, že sa táto oblasť právom stane významným producentom plynu a ropy. Ropovod vedúci z Turkménska do Číny cez Uzbekistan a Kazachstan, schválený minulý rok, je toho jasným dôkazom. To potvrdzuje aj Európa. Bezpečnosť európskych energetických zásob dokáže s pomocou krajín kaspického regiónu zaistiť, že akákoľvek hospodárska obnova nebude ohrozená nevypočítateľnosťou či prílišnou dôverou v jediný zdroj. Zvýšenie energetickej produkcie kaspického regiónu nielen že zvýši disponibilné množstvo na svetových trhoch, ale rovnako prispeje ku globálnej cenovej stabilite.

Je potrebné využiť každý možný motív na zvýšenie iniciatívy v záujme riešenia konfliktov v oblasti, ako napríklad ten medzi Azerbajdžanom a Turkménskom v dôsledku delimitácie podmorských rezervoárov prírodných zdrojov. Spojeným štátom a Európe trvalo celých desať rokov po rozpade Sovietskeho zväzu, kým začali dialóg v oblasti energetickej spolupráce. Transformácia NATO, ktorá odvtedy prebehla, umožňuje uľahčenie dialógu a jeho rozšírenie aj do iných oblastí.

Aj napriek faktu, že sa slovo „energia“ neobjavuje v Strategickej koncepcii Aliancie z roku 1999, pri tom všetkom bývalý generálny tajomník Jaap de Hoop Scheffer pokladal na stretnutí v Bruseli v roku 2005 o novej obrannej agende za vhodné zdôrazniť, že je potrebné „prehĺbiť vzťahy“ s kaukazskými a stredoázijskými štátmi. Minulý október rovnako prijal ponuku vystúpiť s prejavom o „Energetickej bezpečnosti v 21. storočí“ na slávnostnej večeri v Londýne. Spojené štáty a Európa sú v súčasnosti pripravené pracovať spolu aj individuálne za naplnenie spoločných záujmov. Tento proces môže profitovať z dodržiavania príkazu amerického prezidenta Eisenhowera rozšíriť dialóg do komplikovaných oblastí, pri ktorých hrozí strata kontroly. Vďaka svojej celistvosti – okrem Spojených štátov i Európy – má NATO potenciál konštruktívne prispieť k udržaniu energetickej bezpečnosti nielen v členských krajinách Aliancie, ale aj v štátoch s ňou spolupracujúcich, no rovnako môže zintenzívniť a uľahčiť už začaté dialógy v iných organizáciách a fórach.

Slovak translation of "Caspian Diplomacy Should Intensify," first published in Euro-Atlantic Quarterly (Banská Bystrica), vol. 4, no. 4 (October–December 2009): 51.]]> Medvedev urges change to "primitive" economy tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.237 2009-11-20T08:50:25Z 2009-12-21T22:58:01Z

The differentiation in Russian policy and politics between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minster Vladimir Putin is becoming more accentuated....

The differentiation in Russian policy and politics between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minster Vladimir Putin is becoming more accentuated. First published in Asia Times Online, 20 November 2009.]]> The Rise of the Rimland? tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.235 2009-11-13T19:46:37Z 2009-12-21T22:55:28Z

Recent energy and other developments in Southwest Asia, particularly involving Turkey, Iran and Iraq, sketch the outline of an imminent reorganization of international relations in the region. This will have knock-on effects for Eurasia as a whole and the shape of the international system in coming decades. At the same time, it suggests new and unexpected relevance of the mid-20th century geopolitical theorist Nicolas Spykman. First published in Asia Times Online, 13 November 2009.]]> Iran claim clouds Turkey's energy goals tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.267 2009-11-06T06:12:24Z 2010-02-19T13:30:56Z

An Iranian official's declaration that his country has entered into negotiations with European firms about the supply of natural gas into the Nabucco pipeline intended to supply Europe via Turkey was rejected this week by one of the firms concerned. Azerbaijan and Turkey clash over energy, 23 October 2009), such progress, if it is real, holds implications for future Turkey-Azerbaijan cooperation over Nabucco. As Baku is delicately playing Ankara off against Moscow as a potential large-volume consumer, so Ankara has responded by seeking to play Tehran off against Baku. Thus Turkey threatens to use Iran rather than Azerbaijan as the preferred transit country for gas from Turkmenistan for its own domestic consumption and/or onward re-export to Europe through Nabucco. Indeed, it has come to light in the press that, in view of the on-again off-again understandings with the EU over commercial and legal questions (see Nabucco is still alive, 3 July 2009), Turkey wishes to purchase gas at its own northeastern border, then sell it on its western border. This creates potential difficulties insofar as Turkey, being owner of the gas, could then choose to withhold it for domestic consumption or simply to hold it in the Lake Tuz storage facilities that Gazprom three months ago agreed to build for Turkey. Another agreement concluded during a visit by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Tehran calls for a $2 billion investment to construct a crude oil refinery in northern Iran, likewise with an eye towards exports to Europe. In the 1990s, some Kazakhstani oil was exported to Neka, in northern Iran on the Caspian Sea. However, these were "swaps" in return for which Tehran exported equivalent amounts of its own production from its own ports on the Gulf in the south. Moreover, the Kazakhstani volumes were never very great, partly due to the high sulfur content of the Tengiz crude (a problem eventually overcome in principle), but also due to Astana's accumulated dissatisfaction with the Tehran bureaucracy's failure to execute in a timely and businesslike fashion. Some production of oil in Turkmenistan's offshore sectors today goes to northern Iran, but it is very low-volume. As a result of these and other issues, it is therefore difficult to adjudge this project for a crude oil refinery exporting to Europe as realistic. There is a distinction between Turkey's seeking economic cooperation and advantage from Iran and its seeking to be a tribune for Iran's interests. Yet this distinction is not implemented in practice by Turkish diplomacy: thus, for example, Erdogan castigates permanent members of the UN Security Council who advocate implementing sanctions on Tehran for its non-fulfillment of previous resolutions in the sphere of nuclear activities. Such declarations, together with other recent developments beyond the energy sphere, create more than the impression that Ankara sees a strong and defiant Iran as being in Turkey's own national interest. Many international observers have noted, for example, that Turkey invited Syria to participate in joint bilateral military exercises the day after it disinvited Israel from a joint North Atlantic Treaty Organization exercise in which it had long participated in the past. It is difficult to reconcile such moves with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's insistence that Europe remains a main axis of Turkey's foreign-policy doctrine and international orientation. First published in Asia Times Online, 6 November 2009.]]> Turkmenistan gas sets Ciceronian riddle tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.226 2009-10-29T12:22:29Z 2009-12-21T22:56:49Z

First published in Asia Times Online, 30 October 2009.]]> Azerbaijan and Turkey clash over energy tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.273 2009-10-23T13:14:48Z 2010-02-19T13:25:19Z

In all the debate and speculation over the various pipelines planned for the Caspian-South Caucasus corridor and adjacent regions (Nabucco, South Stream, White Stream, and Trans-Caspian Gas Pipelines in addition to various oil pipeline projects), the troubled state of energy relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey has been lost from view, mainly due to their stellar cooperation in the past over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and South Caucasus Pipeline for gas in particular. First published in Asia Times Online, 23 October 2009.]]> ราคายังเป็นตัวจำกัดมิตรภาพจีน-รัสเซีย tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.223 2009-10-17T13:43:42Z 2009-10-28T13:53:19Z

[Thai translation of Price limit on China's Russian friendship.] การไปเยือนจีนของนายกรัฐมนตรี วลาดิมีร์ ปูติน แห่งรัสเซียในสัปดาห์นี้ บ่งบอกให้ทราบว่าความร่วมมือในระดับยุทธศาสตร์ระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองกำลังมี การพัฒนาขยับเข้าใกล้ชิดกันมากยิ่งขึ้น อย่างไรก็ดี การที่ปักกิ่งตกลงใจที่จะใช้วิธีต่อรองอย่างเต็มเหนี่ยว สำหรับราคาก๊าซที่จะนำเข้าจากแดนหมีขาว อันเป็นท่าทีที่เปลี่ยนแปลงไปจากความอะลุ้มอะล่วยด้วยการเสนอให้เงินกู้แบบ ผ่อนปรนในโครงการเกี่ยวกับน้ำมันของมอสโกเมื่อต้นปีนี้ ก็เป็นเครื่องบ่งชี้ว่าความร่วมมือกันดังกล่าวนี้มีข้อจำกัดของมันอยู่...

Price limit on China's Russian friendship.] การไปเยือนจีนของนายกรัฐมนตรี วลาดิมีร์ ปูติน แห่งรัสเซียในสัปดาห์นี้ บ่งบอกให้ทราบว่าความร่วมมือในระดับยุทธศาสตร์ระหว่างประเทศทั้งสองกำลังมี การพัฒนาขยับเข้าใกล้ชิดกันมากยิ่งขึ้น อย่างไรก็ดี การที่ปักกิ่งตกลงใจที่จะใช้วิธีต่อรองอย่างเต็มเหนี่ยว สำหรับราคาก๊าซที่จะนำเข้าจากแดนหมีขาว อันเป็นท่าทีที่เปลี่ยนแปลงไปจากความอะลุ้มอะล่วยด้วยการเสนอให้เงินกู้แบบ ผ่อนปรนในโครงการเกี่ยวกับน้ำมันของมอสโกเมื่อต้นปีนี้ ก็เป็นเครื่องบ่งชี้ว่าความร่วมมือกันดังกล่าวนี้มีข้อจำกัดของมันอยู่ ]]> First published in English by Asia Times Online, 16 October 2009. [Translation by thaiblognews.com]]]> Price limit on China's Russian friendship tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.155 2009-10-16T07:51:34Z 2009-12-21T23:01:18Z

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's visit to China this week is the latest indicator that the rapprochement in Russian-Chinese relations, initiated through the 2001 bilateral "Treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation", which provided for increased Russian arms sales to China and the training of Chinese officers at Russian military schools, is developing steadily into closer strategic cooperation. Burgeoning cooperation in the energy sphere dates from Putin's December 2002 visit to China, as president, when it was agreed that a project for a gas export pipeline to China would be elaborated, with the Kovytka gas field being the most likely candidate for supply. China on buying and lending spree). Putin's latest visit to Beijing, just concluded, did not arrive at definite further agreement in the gas sphere, as some observers had anticipated it might do, but some progress in negotiations appeared to have occurred. Halfway through the talks, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, as quoted by Bloomberg News, told reporters that a contract could be ready by next summer with deliveries to begin in the middle of the next decade either as liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered by tanker or through new pipelines to be constructed. Sechin added that China has agreed to construct two new nuclear reactors at its Tianwan power plant, in Jiangsu province, with Russian help, to purchase electricity from the Russian Far East, and to import Russian coal, definite deals altogether worth $3.5 billion without even taking the negotiations over gas into account. Putin later suggested that the West Siberian gas route could be made operational before the middle of the next decade without a Chinese financial contribution, since the main trunk pipelines already exist and only their extension to China is required. As for the East Siberian route, this might require Chinese capital since the targeted resources in that region are as yet untapped. Price, in particular, has been a sticking point ever since these deals were first discussed, with Russia seeking a pricing regime like the one it uses in Europe, according to which the cost of gas is set in relation to the price of oil. China has sought a lower-priced scheme. In his last comments before departing Beijing, Putin announced an agreement to set the price of gas in relation to an "Asian oil basket" although details remain to be resolved. Nevertheless, despite Putin's announcement of a pricing agreement in principle, his final remarks betrayed more conviction that a deal must in principle be done than that it will in practice be done. As quoted by Associated Press, he avowed the necessity "to argue until we lose our voices, up to the last second", while professing faith that "mutual national interest" will enable the two sides to "reach agreement in the end". Given the fact of the EGP and the fact that Asian markets are the growth markets, it is likely that at least the West Siberian route may be established sometime sooner rather than later. What is clear, however, is that Beijing is driving a hard bargain and is not at present offering concessionary loans of the sort concluded earlier this year in connection with the ESPO oil pipeline. First published in Asia Times Online, 16 October 2009.]]> Қазақстан туралы шет елдерден келіп түскен күнделікті жаңалықтар tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.208 2009-10-13T20:41:10Z 2009-12-05T12:04:12Z

«Asia Times Online» басылымының авторы Роберт М.Катлер (Robert M Cutler) қазанның 10-ы күні «Kazakhstan points route out of crisis» атты мақала жариялап, соңғы уақытта біздің еліміздің халықаралық деңгейде үлкен саяси-экономикалық маңызы бар шешімдерге қол жеткізіп, дағдарыстан шығар жолды көрсеткені туралы тұжырым жасаған....

Kazakhstan points route out of crisis» атты мақала жариялап, соңғы уақытта біздің еліміздің халықаралық деңгейде үлкен саяси-экономикалық маңызы бар шешімдерге қол жеткізіп, дағдарыстан шығар жолды көрсеткені туралы тұжырым жасаған.]]> Kazakh-language press notice of "Kazakhstan Points Way Out of Crisis" from Обзор иностранной прессы c А.Тажутовым [sic], inosmikz.com (n.p.), 13 October 2009.]]> Казахстан указывает на путь выхода из кризиса tag:www.robertcutler.org,2009:/blog//1.204 2009-10-13T20:25:44Z 2009-12-06T22:05:26Z

Визит президента Франции Николя Саркози в Казахстан для подписания сделки по трубопроводу ознаменовал собой неделю, на которой произошло два других важных события (в том числе новый подход к реструктурированию банка), "отслеживающие", как страна, приведенная в боевую готовность, стремится преодолеть экономический кризис....

French President Nicolas Sarkozy's visit to Kazakhstan for the signing of an energy pipeline deal marked a week that included two other significant events, including a novel approach to bank restructuring, that trace how the embattled country is seeking to surmount the economic crisis. Kazakhstan, Central Asia's largest economy, has moved to reinforce its banking system, hard hit by the world economic crisis, by agreeing with the creditors of Alliance Bank on terms for restructuring the financial institution. This is the first time that such a deal has been struck without the bank first having been taken under the state's protection. China deal helps out Kazakhs). The third and potentially furthest-reaching event is the agreement by Kazakhstan with a consortium of French companies on the routing of a pipeline to transport oil from the huge offshore Kashagan deposit to Baku. The deposit, the largest discovered in the world since Prudhoe Bay in Alaska in the 1960s, is being developed by the French company Total in a consortium with Eni, Kazmunaigaz, ExxonMobil, and Shell. Signed this week in Astana in the presence of Presidents Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan and Sarkozy of France, it states that a French consortium composed of Spie, Manesmann-France, Europipe, GTS, and Arcelor-Mittal will have for one year the exclusive right to negotiate the terms of construction with their Kazakh partner. The contract would have a value of US$3 billion, of which more than half would go to French companies, creating several thousand jobs for French workers. The pipeline will run from Eskene in northwest Kazakhstan to Kuryk on its western coast, whence the oil would be taken, presumably by tanker, to Baku so as to enter the existing Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline ending on the eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. It will represent the main section of the previously announced Kazakhstan-Caspian Transport System, or KCTS (see Four-way street in Kazakhstan). The specific terms of the banking arrangement first mentioned also have the potential to be far reaching. It represents an approach to financial restructuring that appears to have been tried nowhere else, including Europe and North America. The deal was constructed within the framework of new Kazakhstani law, which entered into force over the course of the past year, statutorily limiting the prerogatives of creditors. Even the US model has relied exclusively on either letting banks completely fail or on bailing them out with taxpayers' money, all the while guarding the prerogatives of creditors as integrally as possible. The Kazakhstani example demonstrates that with adequate will, the central political executive of a state can overcome creditors' resistance to such measures. The other two events are in line with the continuing development of Kazakhstani energy resources, although the sale of limited ownership in industrial firms is relatively new for Astana and something that the leadership would probably have preferred to avoid. Indeed, Kazakhstan has preferred to negotiate the increase its own stakes in existing projects such as Kashagan, where it successfully imposed new conditions on KMG's Western partners just a year or two ago. The world economic crisis unleashed since then, however, gives added negotiating power to financially stronger players such as China and its state companies. Finally, the negotiation of construction of the KCTS suggests that even in present economic conditions, strong states will find ways to continue to promote energy exploration and production through economically beneficial industrial cooperation. First published by Asia Times Online, 10 October 2009.]]>